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ABSTRACT 
 
An analogy-based approach to object 
categorization would predict that one would 
need more time to categorize an object if it is 
presented together with other objects belong-
ing to the same category. This paper reports 
the results of two psychological experiments 
which confirm this contra-intuitive prediction. 
The two experiments use different kinds of 
stimuli – simple geometric shapes and photos 
of real objects – so a stimulus specific explana-
tion of the results is discarded. 
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THEORIES OF OBJECT RECOGNITION 
AND CATEGORIZATION 
 
There are two major cognitive theories of 
object categorization. According to the tem-
plate-based theory (Poggio & Edelman, 1990, 
Tarr & Bülthoff, 1995, Edelman & Intrator, 
2003), people store image-based exemplars of 
objects in their memory. When having to rec-
ognize a stimulus, they apply various trans-
formations to its image (such as rotation, trans-
lation, zooming) and search for the best match 
across all memorized templates. 
According to the structure-based point of 
view (Marr & Nishihara, 1978; Biederman, 
1987, Hummel, 2000), the human memory 
stores structural description of objects, which 
involve the relations between the parts of the 
objects. Thus, in order to recognize an object, 
people perform an analysis of its structure and 
search for the best structural match. 
None of these theories can account for the 
whole range of phenomena. For example, 
structure-based theories can not explain the 
view-point dependency (Tarr & Bülthoff, 
1995) and the global precedence effects 
(Navon, 1977, Kimchi, 1992). On the other 
hand, the template-based models fail to explain 
phenomena related to the role of spatial rela-
tions in shape perception (Hummel, 2000) and 
the special role of attention (Stankiewicz, 
Hummel, & Cooper, 1998). 
In an attempt to combine the pros and 
cons of both paradigms, some models have 
proposed the existence of a dual route of visual 
recognition and categorization (Hummel & 
Biederman, 1992; Hummel & Stankiewicz, 
1996). According to this account, attention 
determines which recognition path has to be 
used. Although these models have been more 
successful in modeling various psychological 
findings, they still did not manage to explain 
some phenomena such as the global prece-
dence effects (Navon, 1977, Kimchi, 1992) 
and the fact that scene perception can some-
times precede individual object recognition 
(Biederman, Mezzanotte, Rabinowitz, 1982).  
 
 
STRUCTURE-BASED MODELS BASED 
ON ANALOGY-MAKING 
 
During the last two decades a new ap-
proach to structure-based recognition and cate-
gorization of objects has emerged. The basic 
idea behind this approach is to exploit the ad-
vantages of the existing structure-based mod-
els and enhance them by integrating them into 
a more general theory of reasoning with rela-
tions. For example, the structure-mapping the-
ory proposed by Dedre Gentner (Gentner, 
1983) has provided a powerful framework for 
structure based reasoning. Thus, it seemed a 
natural step to apply the proposed fundamental 
principles of analogy-making to modeling 
other cognitive abilities that involve structure 
manipulations. Some researchers (French, 
Hofstadter, 1991, Kokinov, 1998, Hofstadter, 
2001) have even explicitly postulated that 
analogy-making lies at the core of human cog-
nition and most of the human cognitive abili-
ties could be explained by the solely interplay 
of the sub-processes of analogy-making. 
Many of the models of analogy-making 
have been extended to integrate the structure-
based theories of recognition. For example, the 
SEQL model (Lovett, Lockwood, Dehghani, 
Forbus, 2007), an extension of MAC/FAC 
(Forbus, Gentner, Law, 1995) aims to model 
analogy-driven categorization and acquisition 
of new categories. The RecMap model (Pet-
kov, Shahbazyan, 2007), based on the AMBR 
model of analogy-making (Kokinov & Petrov, 
2001), is able to simulate empirical phenom-
ena, which are typically difficult for explana-
tion by conventional structure-based models of 
recognition (Shahbazyan, Petkov, 2007). The 
Hofstadter’s research group has developed 
several models that regard the perception of 
objects and scenes as a kind of analogy-
making process (French, Hofstadter, 1991, 
Marshall, Hofstadter, 1996). On the other 
hand, the dynamic binding mechanisms of the 
Hummel & Biederman’s model of structure-
based categorization (1992) formed the basis 
of the analogy-making model LISA (Hummel, 
Holyoak, 1996). 
There are, however, some valid objections 
against an analogy-based view on object rec-
ognition and categorization. For example, 
analogy-making is supposed to be a relatively 
slow cognitive process and it is not clear how 
it can serve as the fundament of automatic or 
next-to-automatic processes such as recogni-
tion and categorization. The solution to this 
problem might be in that analogy-making hap-
pens to be slow only when complex, cross-
domain, analogies are involved. At the same 
time, analogy-making could be very fast if it is 
applied to associatively related items which 
come from the same modality and knowledge 
domain. The goal of the present study was to 
find evidence for the employment of analogy-
making processes in the categorization of such 
simple stimuli. 
 
PREDICTION 
 
All of the models of analogy-making im-
plement some mechanisms for preserving 
structural consistency (Falkenhainer, Forbus, 
Gentner, 1989, Gentner, 1982, 1983). The role 
of one of the main structural consistency prin-
ciples, the one-to-one mapping constraint is to 
keep the isomorphism between the two situa-
tions which are to be mapped. In other words, 
it tries to prevent two or more elements from 
one of the situations to map onto a single ele-
ment from the other. 
If analogy-making is indeed involved in 
object categorization, then the structural con-
sistency principles intrinsic to analogy-making 
should have an effect on recognition and cate-
gorization as well. For example, the one-to-one 
mapping constraint makes a particular predic-
tion: an object will be categorized more slowly 
if it is presented in the context of other objects 
belonging to the same category. This is be-
cause according to the analogy-based models 
of categorization an object is categorized by 
being mapped to a concept structure residing 
in memory. Hence, if there are several objects 
of the same category in the scene, they all will 
be mapped to the same concept structure (Fig-ure 1). As a result, categorization of each of 
them would be slower when compared to a 
case when all objects belong to different cate-
gories. Although not all analogy-making mod-
els make explicit predictions about the time 
needed to complete an analogy, parallel mod-
els such as LISA (Hummel, Holyoak, 1996) 
and AMBR (Kokinov & Petrov, 2001) assume 
that the analogy emerges as a result of the re-
laxation of a constraint satisfaction network. 
The more competing nodes such a network 
has, the slower it settles down. That is why, 
according to these models, the time needed to 
solve an analogy problem is a function of the 
number of competing mappings. 
The prediction that an object will be cate-
gorized slower in the context of other objects 
belonging to the same category seems contra-
intuitive.  It has been demonstrated (Navon, 
1977, Kimchi, 1992) that a relevant context 
actually accelerates recognition. However, 
such an effect can be due retrieval processes 
and not related to categorization.  
The following experiment was planned to 
confirm or reject the prediction that an object 
will be categorized slower in the context of 
other objects belonging to the same category. 
 
Figure 1. If there are multiple instances of the 
same category in a scene, their mappings would 
compete with and inhibit each other. As a result, 
the overall categorization process will be delayed. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
In this experiment the participants were 
presented with four shapes – squares and tri-
angles. After a short period of time one of the 
shapes was enclosed by a red frame and the 
participants had to respond whether the en-
closed shape was a square or a triangle (Figure 
2).  
 
Design and procedure 
 
A within-subject design was used in this 
experiment. The first independent variable was 
condition - the number of shapes which be-
longed to same category (a circle or a square) 
as the target one. It had three levels – 1 (the 
target shape was unique, for example a target 
square and three triangles); 2 (two squares and 
two triangles); and 3 (there is only one shape, 
which is different from the target one). The 
second independent variable was the SOA in-
terval - the time interval between the stimulus 
onset and onset of the red frame marking the 
target shape. It had three levels: 50ms, 150 ms, 
400 ms.  
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Figure 2. Design of Experiment 1 
 
The dependent variable was the reaction 
time of the participant responses. The partici-
pants were instructed to respond as fast as pos-
sible. The stimulus presentation and the re-
sponses registration were controlled by E-
prime software. 
The type of the target shape (square or tri-
angle) and the position of the target shape (one 
of four vertical positions) were counter-
balanced across trials. 
Each participant went through 300 trials – 
12 practice trials followed by 288 experimental 
trials, presented in a random order.  
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Participants 
 
19 students from New Bulgarian Univer-
sity took part in the experiment as volunteers.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Incorrect responses were excluded from 
the analysis (0.93%), as well as responses with 
reaction times which laying more then 3 stan-
dard deviations from the mean RT (1.34%). 
The remaining data were aggregated by sub-
ject, condition, and SOA. 
A repeated measures ANOVA analysis 
was performed on subject mean reaction times 
and revealed a significant main effect of ‘con-
dition’ (F (2, 36) = 6.335, p = 0.004, SE = 
0.260) (Figure 3) and a significant main effect 
of SOA (F (2, 36) = 4.234, p = 0.022, SE = 
0.190). There was no significant interaction 
between the two factors (F (4, 72) = 1.549, p = 
0.197). 
A set of planned orthogonal contrast tests 
revealed that the effect of ‘condition’ was 
mainly due to the difference between condi-
tions 1 (in which the target stimulus’ shape 
was unique on the screen) and 2 (two squares 
and two triangles) - F (1, 18) = 15.430, p = 
0.001. People responded significantly faster 
when the target shape was unique (mean 
628.90ms) than when there were two shapes 
from the same type (mean 640.52ms). The 
difference between conditions 2 and 3 was not 
significant (F (1, 18) = 1.733, p = 0.204).  
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Figure 3. Experiment 1 results. The main effect of 
‘condition’ was mainly due to the difference be-
tween conditions 1 and 2. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The main effect of SOA is not surprising. 
People responded faster when they had more 
time to look at the stimuli before they had to 
make a decision. 
The main effect of condition, however, is 
in accordance with our prediction. People re-
sponded faster when the target shape was pre-
sented in the context of different shapes.  
The lack of difference between conditions 
2 and 3 bears two possible interpretations. The 
first one is that the inhibition between compet-
ing mappings is not linear, i.e. a certain cate-
gorization is significantly delayed if it is com-
peting with another one, but adding more 
competitors does not change significantly the 
magnitude of this interference. 
Another way to interpret this pattern of re-
sults is to attribute the shorter reaction times in 
condition 1 to a kind of pop-out effect. It could 
have been that the participants’ attention was 
selectively directed to unique shapes and this 
is why they were processed faster. In order to 
rule out this hypothesis we conducted a second 
experiment. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 was a replication of Ex-
periment 1 with a different stimulus set – pho-tographic images of animals and artifacts. In 
each trial, participants were presented with 
four images and after a short period of time 
one of them was marked by a red frame. The 
task was to answer whether the selected im-
ages depicts an animal or not. An image was 
never shown twice to the same subject. Pop-
out effects were not expected to occur as the 
images different substantially from each other 
(Figure 4). 
Figure 4. A sample stimulus used in Ex-
periment 2 
 
Design and procedure 
 
The design and procedure were the same 
as in the first experiment except for two minor 
modifications. First, the levels of the SOA 
factor were changed because the task was ap-
parently more complex. The modified SOA 
intervals were 200ms, 500 ms and 800ms. 
Also, the overall number of trials was reduced 
to 96 as we were unable to compile the same 
number of stimuli as in Experiment 1. 
 
Participants 
 
12 students from New Bulgarian Univer-
sity took part in the experiment as volunteers. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA performed 
on subject RT times revealed a significant 
main effect of ‘condition’ (F (2, 22) = 6.028, p 
= 0.008, SE = 0.354) and a significant main 
effect of SOA (F (2, 22) = 10.564, p = 0.001, 
SE = 0.490) but failed to find a significant in-
teraction between the two factors (F (4, 44) = 
0.761, p = 0.556). The results are presented in 
Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Experiment 2 results. The same main 
effects of ‘condition’ and SOA were obtained, al-
though a pop-up effect was prevented by using a 
different stimulus set. 
 
The main effect of condition was not en-
tirely explained by the difference between two 
of the levels of the factor, as in the first ex-
periment. The reaction time increased as func-
tion of the number of stimuli which belonged 
to the same category as the target stimulus 
(mean 713.17ms for condition 1, 736.26ms for 
condition 2, and 759.38ms for condition 3). 
Additional contrast tests failed to find differ-
ences between conditions 1 and 2, as well be-
tween conditions 2 and 3. Thus it was demon-
strated that a one-to-one mapping constraint in 
object categorization is found even when all 
the presented stimuli are different from each 
other and belong to natural categories so that a 
pop-out effect is not possible. 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper described and attempt to find 
empirical support for the analogy-driven mod-
els of object categorization. A particular pre-
diction was formulated by taking into account  
one of the basic principles of the structure 
mapping theory: the one-to-one mapping con-
straint. It was hypothesized that an object will 
be categorized slower if it is presented together 
with other objects belonging to the same cate-
gory. 
Two experiments were conducted in order 
to test this prediction. The first one provided 
evidence for a one-to-one mapping constraint 
in categorization of simple geometrical shapes. 
The second one replicated the result by using 
stimuli belonging to natural categories.  
The results of both the experiments render 
support for the hypothesis that the mechanisms 
of analogy-making could be fast enough to be 
employed by highly automated cognitive proc-
esses. In broader terms, the present study con-
stitute an argument in favor of the view that 
the principles of analogy-making lie at the core 
of human cognition.  
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